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SECRET.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES REPORT.

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FOREIGN COUNTRIES REPORT.

ALBANIA.

Relations with Serbia.—On 4th November Sir Alban Young reported [No. 244] from Belgrade that a press bureau there had issued a communiqué emphatically denying the truth of the reports in the foreign press respecting a Serbian invasion of Albania. It stated that the operations of the Serbian troops had been confined to the re-establishment of the demarcation line which the Tirana Government had violated (? some) weeks ago at a time when it thought that the Albanian question would be settled according to its (? desire), namely, by the re-establishment of the frontiers of 1913, and had accordingly sent troops to occupy the territory.

On the other hand, a press telegram from Uskub dated 3rd November stated that the Serbian troops on the river Drin in the Prisrend area, having been attacked by the Tirana troops who held the villages of Suraj Nemzi and Kolsh, had counter-attacked, crossing the Drin in the neighbourhood of Bushati, and had occupied (? the above mentioned) villages with the assistance of the native population.

A further telegram stated that in a recent action round Kalinit Aras the Serbian troops captured over 650 Tirana soldiers and 12 officers, two of the latter being Italians, who stated that they had been sent into Albania to reorganize the Tirana army.

On the same day Mr. Eyres reported [No. 46] from Durazzo that the Serbs had occupied Lurja and Oroshi, and advanced south to within one hour of Lisa. The Mati valley was crowded with refugees and others were (? being) driven into the snow on the mountains. The Albanian Government was at the end of its munitions of war and resources; and the whole administration north of Tirana was dislocated.

[See under "Serbia."]

Frontiers.—On 5th November Lord Hardinge reported [No. 851] that the Conference of Ambassadors had fixed the frontiers of Albania that morning, and that the Italians had accepted under protest the compromise for Kastrati.

Recognition of the Government.—On 7th November Lord Curzon instructed [No. 20] Mr. Eyres to inform the Albanian Government that, in view of the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference regarding the frontiers of Albania, His Majesty's Government recognized the present Albanian Government as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* Government of the whole of Albania.

And on the 10th November Sir George Buchanan reported [No. 453] that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had welcomed the action taken by His Majesty's Government, and would also recognize the Albanian Government both as the *de jure* and the *de facto* Government.

ARABIA.

Negotiations with King Hussein [F.C.R., lv, p. 2].—Lord Curzon telegraphed [No. 99] as follows to Major Marshall at Jeddah on 9th November:—

Fuad-el-Khatib telegraphed direct on 5th November to the Foreign Office that King Hussein apologizes for the message sent in the Cairo telegram No. 598 (of 26th October) and wishes to re-open negotiations through Abdullah. Please make a suitable acknowledgment.

Please telegraph if King Hussein really desires to open negotiations and, if so, make sure that Abdullah is actually given full powers to sign the treaty. The text of the draft treaty in your despatch of 10th October shows that such full powers were given by King Hussein to Ali and Fuad-el-Khatib. Presumably they were subsequently withdrawn by King Hussein; otherwise it is not clear why his signature to the treaty should have been required at all.

In any case it is now too late to arrange for a visit of the Prince of Wales.

To this Major Marshall replied [No. 95] on 14th November:—

King Hussein sent to Emir Abdullah his own copy of the treaty. He has sent me a copy of the letter sent with this treaty, and in that letter he authorizes the Emir to rewrite and sign the treaty provided that he sticks to the rights mentioned in King

Hussein's decision, a copy of which is being sent to the Emir by one of his representatives. This is presumably Abdul Malik. King Hussein has not sent me a copy of this decision. Personally I am opposed to accepting the treaty not signed or ratified by King Hussein himself. From previous experience I am of opinion that any other signature is worthless, and on two previous occasions he has repudiated Emir Abdullah's signature. In this case if it suits him he will simply say that the Emir did not (? carry out) his decisions.

I acknowledged Fuad's telegram in suitable terms.

ARMENIA.

The Armenians of Cilicia [F.C.R., liv, p. 2].—Sir Horace Rumbold telegraphed [No. 719] as follows from Constantinople on 10th November :—

The heads of the three Armenian relief (? committees) called on me again to-day and informed me that the publication of the Franco-Kemalist convention had confirmed their previously expressed apprehensions, as it contained no guarantee of the security of the christians in Cilicia beyond the mere word of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. If the terms of the convention are carried out, Cilicia will be evacuated by the French in less than two months. The situation of the christians will then be even worse than that prevailing in the rest of Anatolia owing to the recent state of war between the Turks and the Armenians, and the fact that the Franco-Turkish negotiations had not been accompanied by any reconciliation between the warring races, and no objection has been raised to the abolition by the Kemalists of the ancient privileges of the patriarchates.

The Armenian patriarch has received a telegram, dated 8th November, from the catholicos of Cilicia stating that it is the unalterable determination of his community to emigrate in order to escape a catastrophe, and asking that shipping may be provided and places of safety indicated. My visitors pointed out that Armenians have returned to Cilicia after the armistice under pressure from the British authorities in Syria and Egypt, when assurances were given that the allied occupation of that province guaranteed their safety; and they now appealed to the sense of justice of His Majesty's Government not to abandon this remnant of the Armenian nation to its fate, but to use their influence with the French Government to take effective measures for its protection.

I said I quite appreciated the difficulty of the situation, but all I could do was to report the circumstances to my Government.

They had seen the reports of the French High Commissioner's interview with the representatives of the local press and his warning to the Turks of the deplorable results which would follow any ill-treatment of the christian minorities, and credit must be given to General Pelle for the anxiety which he evidently feels on that score. They also must know the material impossibility of meeting the request for shipping to transport so large a body of refugees at such short notice to unknown destinations.

They replied that, if this solution was ruled out, the alternatives were either to stay and face the consequences, which meant destruction, or to get the French to delay evacuation until a definite treaty of peace provided a settlement of the Armenian question.

I said that the latter alternative would imply a revision of the Franco-Kemalist convention, which would be difficult to obtain; and asked whether the Cilician Armenians could not be transferred by land to the French mandatory area in Syria. On their suggesting that the French might not accept them, I replied that that was a matter which concerned the French, but Syria appeared to be the only safe place to which the people could be evacuated in time if the French withdraw their troops in the term laid down by the convention.

AUSTRIA.

The Plébiscite.—The following telegram [No. 264] was sent from Vienna by Mr. Lindley on 5th November :—

The Austrian Government learn from Oedenburg that the generals intend to hold the plébiscite within eight days of the withdrawal of the bands. If no allied troops are present, the plébiscite will be held under the Hungarian occupation.

The Austrian Government have protested strongly at Paris and declared that the

conditions on which the Austrian Parliament sanctioned the continuance of the negotiations will not have been fulfilled unless the plébiscite is carried out by common accord. In these circumstances, the Austrian Government will not recognize its validity.

I need not point out that a plébiscite held under Hungarian administration and forces will be regarded here as a pure farce. In the other neighbouring States it will probably be considered somewhat worse.

BELGIUM.

Customs on German goods.—On 4th November Sir George Grahame reported [No. 178] from Brussels that the Belgian Government intended to increase considerably the customs duties on German goods, and that a new tariff would come into force immediately. The goods concerned would be manufactured articles, of which labour formed a large part of the cost of production. Foodstuffs and raw materials for Belgian industries would not be affected.

It was reported that the entire Belgian customs tariff in respect of imports from all countries would be revised before the end of the year, in order to bring the customs policy into line with the protectionist measures adopted by other countries.

CHINA.

Macao [F.C.R., liv, p. 3].—The following telegram was sent [No. 339] to Sir Beilby Alston on 4th November with reference to his own of 17th October [No. 389]:—

Lord Curzon informed him that the following course of action was proposed:—That steps may be taken to secure the final settlement of the boundary question, the Portuguese Government will be pressed to submit the matter to the League of Nations; that the Portuguese Government will be asked whether they would be willing, as an act of grace, to allow the Chinese the free use of that half of the harbour which gives them access to their own territory—if so, His Majesty's Government would advise the Chinese to discuss the question in a reasonable spirit, and would intimate that a condition precedent to any discussion must be the removal of the gunboat; and that the incident of 16th September must be dealt with on the spot, though it will be made clear to the Chinese that there can be no *ex parte* settlement, and that in the event of active aggression on their part His Majesty's Government would be compelled to support the Portuguese.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

Agreement with Poland.—Telegraphing [No. 159] from Prague on 7th November, Sir George Clerk reported that the Prime Minister had announced the signature of the Polish-Czecho-Slovak agreement on the previous afternoon. Of the nine articles of which the agreement consisted the most important were the following:—Article 2.—The exercise of a benevolent neutrality in the case of an attack by a neighbouring State, and permission for the free transit of war material. Article 3.—The disinterestedness of Czecho-Slovakia in Eastern Galicia, the dissolution of Ukrainian formations and the suppression of anti-Polish propaganda, with reciprocal obligations by Poland. Article 4.—Mutual and reciprocal recognition of all political and economical agreements between Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Jugo-Slavia on the one side, and Poland, France and Rumania on the other. Article 5.—The settlement of economic and financial questions by a commercial convention. Article 6.—Important disputes to be settled by arbitration. Subject to the arrangement for the settlement of certain frontier disputes by a joint Polish and Czecho-Slovakian delegation, the agreement was to last for five years with the option of denunciation after two years.

FRANCE.

The Angora Agreement.—On 12th November Sir Horace Rumbold reported [No. 725] from Constantinople that at a banquet of the French colony on Armistice Day the French High Commissioner made the following references to the Franco-Nationalist agreement:—

In concluding the agreement France has given a striking proof of her respect for the self-determination of peoples, and of confidence in her former enemies. The

agreement is not peace. It is a reversion to the armistice status which the attacks of the Nationalist forces had broken. France has still to bring about, in concert with her Allies, that lasting and definite peace which is indispensable for the two belligerents still face to face with one another, and so necessary to the commercial prosperity of Constantinople.

Let us hope that the French agreement at Angora may serve as an example and as the forerunner of the inevitable "transactions" which will finally restore peace in the Near East.

GERMANY.

Finance.—The following telegram [No. 517] was sent by Lord d'Abernon on 6th November:—

I had an interview with the Chancellor yesterday. His Excellency said that his policy would continue to be "fulfilment up to Germany's utmost capacity." The fall in the mark, however, rendered payment in gold increasingly onerous; the liability of $3\frac{1}{2}$ milliard gold marks had represented a month ago 70 milliard paper—already (? a) sum exceeding Germany's revenue. To-day it represented 150 milliards of paper marks—more than twice the present revenue.

He had some (? confidence), however, that the Reichstag would accept his taxation scheme, which would increase the revenue by 40 milliards and bring it up to between 90 and 100 milliards a year.

The Upper Silesia decision had diminished Germany's physical capacity to pay, while the moral effect of the disappointment at so unfair and unexpected a division of the industrial triangle had undoubtedly been a great factor in the fall of the mark. He had been in different parts of Germany; everywhere he was asked the same questions: "What does it mean?" "Is there to be no return to Germany for her efforts in paying milliards?" "Do they intend to bring us down altogether?"

He was alarmed by the increasing influence of France in Central Europe. Until lately he had thought that Czecho-Slovakia would retain some independence—now she appeared to have entered into a French and Polish (? combination). (? The treaty) between Warsaw and Prague was significant.

The Treaty with the United States.—On 12th November Lord d'Abernon reported [No. 520] that the ratifications of peace between the United States of America and Germany had been exchanged the night before.

UPPER SILEZIA.

Kidnapping.—Sir H. Stuart telegraphed [No. 379] from Oppeln as follows on 10th November:—

The inter-allied commission continues to receive complaints as to the kidnapping of persons in the plébiscite area and their detention in Germany and Poland. As the commission has in many cases no means of verifying those statements, and as the representations made by it to the two Governments concerned have had no effect, my colleagues and I have considered it desirable to request our respective Governments to take steps in Berlin and Warsaw with a view to obtaining the liberation of all persons who have been kidnapped in and removed from the plébiscite area. It would further be desirable that the inter-allied commission should be authorized to send a delegate to Germany and Poland, especially to the camps at Kottbus in Germany and Sosnowice in Poland, in which camps it would appear from the information available that the majority of the kidnapped persons are detained.

HUNGARY.

The House of Habsburg.—Mr. Hohler telegraphed [No. 420] from Budapest on 4th November the following literal translation of the Bill before Parliament for the abolition of the sovereign rights of King Karl and of the hereditary succession of the house of Habsburg:—

1. The sovereign rights of King Karl are abolished.
2. The pragmatic sanction contained in Laws 1 and 2 of 1723 and regulating the hereditary succession of the house of Austria has lost its legal force, and thus the nation has regained the right of freely choosing a king.

3. The nation maintains its traditional constitutional kingdom, though it puts off filling the royal throne to some later date and entrusts the Government with the task of bringing forward proposals for this purpose at a suitable time.

4. This law comes into force on the day of its promulgation.

On the following day Mr. Hohler telegraphed [No. 427] the following translation of a telegram sent that day to the Conference of Ambassadors by the allied diplomatic representatives in reply to a telegram received from the Conference on 4th November:—

We have anticipated the latest instructions of the Conference of Ambassadors regarding the addition of an article to the law proclaiming the dethronement of the Habsburgs. We have now once more drawn the attention of the Hungarian Government in a most categorical manner to the views of the Conference of Ambassadors in regard to the necessity of this fresh step. By reason, however, of the great responsibility incumbent on us, we consider it our duty to explain to our Governments, without reserve, the situation as it presents itself to us at Budapest to-day:—

(1) The Hungarian Government have formed the opinion that, as a result of the abolition of the pragmatic sanction, and of the consequent dethronement of all the Habsburgs from the throne of Hungary, they are compelled to revert to the principle of free election (? customary) before 1526, and to formulate it in the law of the land.

(2) The Hungarian Government have not deemed it desirable on this occasion to specify that the Habsburgs will not be eligible, because the Conference of Ambassadors have confined themselves to demanding the *déchéance* of the dynasty; because this *déchéance* prevents any Habsburg restoration in conformity with the preceding decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors; and because in these circumstances the Hungarian Government cannot in any way contemplate preparing for the election of a Habsburg prince.

(3) In proof of the above, the Hungarian Government have (? undertaken to) make a formal written declaration to us in this sense when communicating the official text of the law. Now we must assume that this declaration, which is of ephemeral import, will, strictly speaking, be the only thing in Hungarian eyes. In point of fact, the traditional laws of this country have always declared as inoperative the dethronement of any monarch on the part of Parliament, and there are even two examples in history, in 1160 and 1848, when sovereigns thus deposed have subsequently reigned without any fresh legislative measure having been considered necessary to re-establish them in their imprescriptible right. Consequently the present law is merely a satisfaction given to the Czech Government and all depends on the determination of the Hungarian Government, which can incidentally be counted upon with absolute assurance to conform themselves to the will of the Great Powers, that all Habsburgs should be excluded from the throne. Moreover, one law can always be rendered void by another.

Should the above observations present themselves to the Conference of Ambassadors as a reason for insisting with even greater emphasis upon the assertion of a supplementary article in the law, the representatives of the principal allied Powers venture to point out that such a proposal, if submitted by the Hungarian Government to the National Assembly, would, at the present pitch of national exasperation, endanger the existence of the Cabinet and the acceptance of the law, and bring about the immediate invasion of Hungary.

The problem therefore resolves itself into deciding whether, after so many efforts have been made to restore tranquillity, this invasion would be advantageous or a misfortune in the present state of Central Europe, and whether, furthermore, it is compatible with justice after the clear guarantees of submission given by the Hungarian Government.

The problem is one which the Conference of Ambassadors alone can determine; the allied representatives having done their utmost, not only to keep their Governments fully informed in regard to a situation of far-reaching possibilities, but also, throughout the dramatic events of the past days, to exercise upon the Hungarian Government all the pressure humanly possible in exceptionally difficult moral and political circumstances.

Telegraphing [No. 429] again on the same day, Mr. Hohler said:—

We had a meeting with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening, when they informed us that the law had been passed and that they were about to communicate it to us officially. Article 3 (? charges) the Government with

the task of bringing forward proposals for filling the throne, and they intended making to us a written declaration that the Government undertook not to propose not only any Habsburg, but also any other person who should not be acceptable to the Great Powers, and that they intended further to introduce, in a week or two, a law for punishing those people who might make propaganda in favour of any candidate to the throne. Referring to the note we had presented to-day, on instructions received from Paris, to the effect that the exclusion of Habsburgs must be specified in the law itself, they stated that they did not receive this note until the law had already been passed (we know this to be a fact). They considered, however, that the exclusion was more firmly decided by their declaration than by the insertion in the law; as one took the form of an international obligation, whereas the other was liable to revocation. As to the passing of a fresh law the Prime Minister stated formally that his Government had gone to the utmost of its power and was not able to go further.

On 6th November Mr. Hohler reported [No. 431] that he and his colleagues had received a note from the Hungarian Government, officially communicating the text of the law decreeing:—

- (1) The *déchéance* of King Karl.
- (2) The abrogation of the pragmatic sanction and the *déchéance* of all Habsburgs.
- (3) Conferring on the Government the duty of filling the throne at a convenient time.

The Hungarian Government declare that they undertake the obligation to follow the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of 4th February 1920 and 3rd April 1920, the one forbidding the restoration of the Habsburgs. Moreover, before undertaking the solution of the king question, they will first come to an understanding with the Great Powers represented at the conference, and will not proceed without their consent.

To ensure more effectively the aim of the law, and to safeguard the responsibility of the Government, it is intended to pass another law edicting penalties on any attempt to make propaganda in favour of the Habsburgs, or any other person not duly approved in the manner above described.

The law to-day passed the third reading, and is to be proclaimed this afternoon.

Two days later Mr. Hohler further reported [No. 437] that the representatives of the Little Entente, in presenting a new note, had stated that as regards the Habsburg question their Governments were entirely satisfied with the arrangements which had been come to.

JAPAN.

Military Budget.—Sir Charles Eliot telegraphed [No. 443] on 12th November that the military attaché had ascertained from the Ministry of War that 253,000,000 yen is the correct amount of the proposed military budget for the next year, which shows a reduction of 10,000,000 yen compared with the current budget. The military attaché does not think that this small reduction has any connexion with the Washington Conference.

The figures quoted in my telegram represent the amount sanctioned by a cabinet council for presentation to the Diet, but they will probably be increased by supplementary grants. On the other hand some people say that the financial position is so bad that a general reduction will be necessary.

Naval Budget.—On 14th November Sir Charles Eliot reported [No. 449] that the figures for the naval budget were 135 million yen ordinary expenditure and 258 million extraordinary; a decrease of 109 (? 108) million yen compared with the present budget, due to postponing the construction of a light cruiser, one (? sweeper) and small craft and consequent economies in dockyard work. He added that the (? Minister for Foreign Affairs) had informed him that a reduction of the expenditure of the navy and other departments was necessary because the revenue, especially the income-tax, had proved to be less than was expected.

PARAGUAY.

Revolution.—On 2nd November Mr. Macleay, telegraphing [No. 162] from Buenos Aires, reported that he had received the following message, dated 31st October, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Asuncion:—The President of the Republic was

yesterday compelled by Schaerer to resign. The *coup d'état* took place without violence, but the political situation is very serious.

Telegraphing [No. 168] again on 10th November Mr. Macleay further reported that the following telegrams had been exchanged between His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Asuncion and himself:—

(1) Asuncion, 9th November. A new Government under the temporary President, Dr. Eusebio Ayala, has been legally established by a full Congress and a new Cabinet formed; and the situation appears to be normal. At a meeting of the corps diplomatique this morning to discuss the question as to recognition, it was decided to consider the new Government as a continuation of the previous one, and to accept, without any remark, the invitation to meet the new Minister for Foreign Affairs in case there is no time to receive instructions from our respective Governments. No other course appears to be desirable. Do you see any objection?

(2) Buenos Aires, 10th November. Your telegram of 9th November. As the temporary President appears to have been constitutionally appointed by Congress, I see no objection to the adoption of the course agreed upon at the meeting of the corps diplomatique, and I am so informing the Foreign Office.

PERSIA.

South Persia Rifles [F.C.R., lv, p. 6].—Telegraphing [No. 611] on 3rd November, Mr. Bridgeman reported as follows:—In consequence of attacks on the South Persia Rifles' camp at Kazerun, I have asked the Persian Government to take all possible steps to protect the convoy of British officers proceeding to Bushire from Shiraz, adding that the Persian Government would be held responsible. His Majesty's consul at Shiraz has arranged for a Cossack officer to accompany the convoy as the representative of the Persian Government.

In a further telegram [No. 624] dated 11th November, Mr. Bridgeman reported that the Persian Government had replied that orders had been telegraphed to the Governor-General of Fars to ensure the safety of the officers, and that he had had them escorted.

External Arrangements [F.C.R., lv, p. 6].—Mr. Bridgeman telegraphed [No. 613] on 5th November that Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh had arrived and was going to Tiflis by the next train, and was expected to leave about 9th November; he was going thence to Baku, where he was to study the conditions. According to information he hoped to make a commercial treaty with the Azerbaijan Government. He had not yet decided if he would go to Constantinople before proceeding to Angora.

On 13th November Mr. Bridgeman transmitted [No. 626] a report from the military attaché that the Russian Minister had asked Moscow for six consuls, who should have had previous experience of the country, to be sent for service in South Persia. The report also stated that 10 Swedish officers, under a Colonel Mogski, were said to have left Sweden for Teheran to take up the duties of instructors for the Persian army.

With reference to the second part of this report the Secretary of State telegraphed [No. 452] on 15th November that, pending negotiations concerning their salaries, no Swedish officers had yet left for Persia. Colonel Mossberg, formerly military attaché in London, was the colonel in charge.

Abdul Baha and his Adherents.—On 13th November Mr. Bridgeman telegraphed [No. 631] as follows:—The representative of Abdul Baha has asked me to facilitate remittances from the Bahais in Persia to Abdul Baha at Haifa, for the maintenance of the latter and his suite. His adherents wish to remit at once 4,000*l.* and to send yearly remittances amounting to about 50,000 tomans. The Imperial Bank of Persia refuses to place drafts to anyone, and the Bahais cannot remit the money unless we afford facilities.

As your Lordship knows, the Bahais are very numerous and are ever increasing in Persia. To refuse them facilities requested for the accomplishment of what to them is a sacred duty would offend an influential and well disposed section of the people. In view of the religious aspect of the question I cannot mention the matter to Persian Government. Please instruct whether and how the operation should be facilitated.

RUSSIA.

Protest against International Conference.—The following message [No. 7617] from M. Chicherin was transmitted by wireless from Moscow on 3rd November, addressed to Lord Curzon, M. Briand, and to the American, French, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors in London:—

La déclaration du dix-neuf juillet par laquelle le gouvernement russe protestait contre la convocation d'une conférence internationale sur la question du Pacifique sans sa participation, resta ignorée des puissances. En vue de l'ouverture prochaine de cette conférence le gouvernement russe répète sa protestation contre cette tentative de résoudre en l'absence des représentatives de la Russie des problèmes, qui la touchent immédiatement, ainsi que sa déclaration qu'il conserve sa pleine liberté d'action dans toutes les questions qui auront été traitées à cette conférence, et fera valoir cette liberté dans toutes les occasions et par tous les moyens qu'il jugera opportuns. Le peuple travailleur de Russie a accueilli avec la plus grande indignation cette nouvelle manifestation de la politique de violence et d'injustice suivie à son égard. Le gouvernement ouvrier et paysan de Russie déclare qu'un peuple de cent trente millions ne permettra pas qu'on fasse violence à sa volonté et ne se laissera pas traiter comme un objet inerte des décisions d'autrui. Le peuple travailleur de Russie qui consacre ses plus grands efforts sur sa reconstruction économique sait que, malgré la famine résultant du blocus des Alliés et de la sécheresse, le moment de la renaissance de sa force économique et de sa puissance politique approche rapidement. Ce qui actuellement violent les exigences les plus élémentaires de sa dignité et de ses droits souverains, se trouveront alors face à face avec les résultats de leur conduite envers la Russie. Ce n'est qu'avec la plus grande indignation que les peuples de Russie peuvent accueillir la déclaration d'après laquelle les puissances se chargent de veiller elles-mêmes sur leurs intérêts. La Russie a, durant ces dernières années, suffisamment expérimenté ce qu'est la sollicitude des grandes puissances pour ses intérêts, ceux qui prétendent maintenant veiller à ses intérêts sont les mêmes gouvernements qui arrosèrent de sang son territoire en précipitant contre elle les généraux tsaristes et que l'étrangèrent (*sic*) dans le cordon meurtrier du blocus. Le peuple travailleur de Russie comprend à merveille que si ces puissances s'occupent de résoudre pour la Russie les questions qui touchent à ses intérêts la décision sera portée sous l'empire des intérêts tout autres que les siens la solution sera trouvée au détriment des peuples de Russie. Ces derniers savent d'avance que tout accord entre les puissances qui prendront sur elles décider pour la Russie sera certainement un acte du même ordre que les traités de Versailles et de Sèvres. Mais la Russie n'est pas un pays vaincu. Elle est sortie victorieuse de toutes les épreuves que lui ont fait subir les puissances qui s'arrogent maintenant la tâche de veiller à ses intérêts. Les masses laborieuses de Russie ont suffisamment démontré qu'elles savent résister aux tentatives de violence venant de l'extérieur et elles repousseront de même toute nouvelle tentative analogue. Quels que soient les accords ostensifs qui seront adoptés à Washington, le soupçon et presque la certitude subsisteront toujours que des accords secrets ont été conclus au détriment de la Russie et un élément de plus de défiance, de suspicion, et de complications, aura été introduit dans les relations internationales. Dans ces conditions les décisions de la conférence de Washington seront inévitablement la source de nouveaux conflits, de nouveaux troubles, et de nouvelles secousses. Loïn d'apporter la pacification elle apportera le trouble, la lutte, et l'haine dans la vie internationale des peuples et sera seulement la cause de nouvelles calamités pour l'humanité.

Economic Policy.—Mr. Max Muller telegraphed [No. 429] from Warsaw on 4th November that in a conversation with the head of the credit department of the Ministry of Finance, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires had drawn special attention to the decree of his Government relating to the negotiation of debts which, he explained, had already become law. He had laid special emphasis on the fact that it indicated a radical change in economic policy on the part of the Soviet Government.

SERBIA.

Relations with Albania.—On 7th November the following telegram [unnumbered] was sent by Mr. Lloyd George to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations:—

The continued advance of the Yugoslav forces into Albania being of a nature to disturb international peace, His Majesty's Government desire to call the attention of

the council thereto, and request that you will take immediate steps to summon a meeting of the council to consider the situation, and to agree upon the measures to be taken under Article 16 in the event of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing or delaying to execute their obligations under the covenant.

The Ambassadors' Conference have now decided the frontiers of Albania, which will at once be notified to the interested parties.

On 11th November Sir Alban Young telegraphed [No. 256] as follows from Belgrade:—

I met the Assistant-Minister for Foreign Affairs at a reception at the Italian Legation this morning. M. Popovitch was indignant at the statement made in the House of Commons that Yugoslav troops had invaded Albania. I said that I had telegraphed to you the *démenti* I had received here; that your information was obtained from the Albanian Government; that somebody had invaded Albania, and as the Serbs seemed to identify their cause with that of Mirdites it was not unnatural to tar them with the same brush. M. Popovitch then complained bitterly that the British Government had summoned the council of the League of Nations on the assumption that the Serbs would not conform with the decisions of the conference. I said that this precaution would show him in what low esteem his country had fallen. Never since it became the duty of the Ambassadors' Conference to execute treaties had the Serbs conformed with a decision with a good grace. The conference was always kept in a state of alarm as to what the Serbs would or would not do. How often during my two years of office had not I had to form one of a party of three commissioned to overcome Serbs' recalcitrancy? The deplorable impression that had been created was now evident. Here was the opportunity for the Serbs to rehabilitate themselves by withdrawing from the line of demarcation without waiting for collective demarcation. But how, said M. Popovitch, can we withdraw until we know where we are to withdraw to? We must wait until the commission of delimitation arrived to show us our frontier. I expressed my impatience at this chicanery and alluded to the dangers which it entailed. It would, however, be characteristic policy for this Government to follow.

M. Popovitch also spoke of Sasseno Island and said that Albanian integrity must be respected by all alike. I told him that Sasseno Island was of no possible interest to the Serbs, and that it was a matter between Albania and Italy.

On 14th November Sir Alban further reported [No. 263] that the following telegram had that day been sent to Paris in regard to a joint communication which was made by the allied representatives in writing on 7th November:—

To-day we have received a written reply, of which the following is a summary:—

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have never undertaken, or thought of undertaking, any offensive whatever against Albania. The conflict at Kaltcherite has arisen out of the fact that the Government of Tirana had sent their army to occupy the positions which the Serbian army had held since the end of the war in order to defend themselves against Albanian raids.

We are reminded of the attacks of last year in the same place, which resulted in a note addressed on 23rd August (? 1920) to the allied Governments requesting the immediate despatch of a commission of enquiry—a request which had not been accorded.

The note then proceeds to point out that the Government of Tirana was now engaged in a desperate struggle with the Mirdites, a christian tribe which would not submit itself to the tyranny of the Government of Tirana and which had therefore constituted itself into an independent Mirdite republic. The Mirdites had by their own forces liberated the entire soil of Mirdita, and during these operations the Serbian army had not advanced an inch beyond Kaltcherite, where it now stood.

In conclusion, the note points out that the Government of Tirana had tried by force to occupy the frontiers of 1913, which up to the present had neither been completely traced nor respected by the frontier tribes.

Telegraphing [No. 264] again on the same day Sir Alban reported that he had received a letter from Professor Achikou, at Belgrade, describing himself as Minister of Public Worship and delegate of the Mirdites, asking him to communicate to his Government, as an explanation of the situation in Albania, a telegram received from Marka Djoni (? President of the Republic) of the Mirdites. This telegram, which was dated Pristina, 9th November, denied the reports that the Mirdite troops had been aided by Serbian troops and stated that "our valiant people, without any foreign

" assistance, had succeeded in liberating their sacred soil from Bolshevik Kemalists troops of Tirana."

Partial Demobilization.—On 9th November Sir Alban Young telegraphed [No. 253] that the military attaché had reported that orders were issued last night for the commencement of partial demobilization. The measures were confined to the suspension of the execution of the order calling up the three classes, and to the release of all reservists, transport, &c., either assembled at the recruiting district headquarters or on their way to join their units in the concentration areas.

In other respects the situation remained as before, and all units already assembled in the concentration areas were to remain there until further orders. This included the retention of reservists who had already joined these units.

Telegraphing [No. 265] again on 14th November, Sir Alban reported that the Ministry of War had that day informed the military attaché that orders for the demobilization of all reservists, &c., called up for operations against Hungary had been issued on the night of 12th November, and that information had already been received from the fourth army that demobilization had commenced.

It was expected that demobilization would be completed in about 10 days.

Demobilization orders did not, however, affect reservists who, when called up, had been drafted into units on the Albanian front. Such reservists were to be retained until further orders.
